We examine whether a strong indigenous manufacturing base is a necessary condition for sustainable economic growth in the case of two small, open economies, Ireland and Sweden. Sweden has been impacted by the economic crisis to a lesser degree than Ireland; we explore (through a manufacturing activity lens) the reasons for the asymmetric impacts and ask if the nature of the shock is related to 'Economic Sovereignty' and to the type of industrial policy. We argue Sweden was less affected given that its indigenous firms control the highly export-focussed and technologybased engineering sector whereas in Ireland high-technology sectors are controlled by foreign firms. In terms of policy implications, we suggest that industrial policy should aim for sustainable economic activity and growth such that industrial activity within the economy should be able to minimise the impact of asymmetric shocks such as the current global economic recession.
Introduction
High-profile Multinational Enterprise (MNE) job losses have featured regularly in the Irish news of late contributing significantly to Ireland's unemployment rate (13.4 per cent in December 2010; CSO 2010). Such developments have put into question the sustainability of Ireland's industrial policy which, we argue, has focused most of its efforts on FDI/MNEs to the detriment of an indigenous (largely SME) sector. This paper argues that industrial economic development policy should aim for sustainable economic activity and growth; industrial activity within the economy should be able to minimise the impact of asymmetric shocks such as the current global economic recession.
In light of the above, the current paper asks whether a strong indigenous industrial base is a necessary condition for sustainable economic growth. We explore this issue in a number of ways. On a general level, we approach the question via the experience of two countries (Ireland and Sweden) comparable on the basis of their size and openness. We also look at whether Ireland can learn from the industrial development trajectory of the Swedish economy. Other countries (especially EU accession States) have held Ireland up as a role model for industrial development [e.g. Sapir et al, 2003; Sapir, 2005 Sapir, , 2006 and Acs et al., 2007] , while others have taken a more nuanced and balanced view (Andreosso-O'Callaghan and Bailey et al., 2009 ). Our approach is radically different: we look at Sweden to assess the Irish industrial development strategy adopted to date and to garner lessons for future industrial policy. The economy of Sweden seems to have been less negatively impacted than Ireland by the recent economic downturn. We explore reasons for the asymmetric effects of the shock. Is it due to the fact that Swedish industrial policy has placed more emphasis on having a balanced/diversified industrial sector in terms of firm ownership (whether indigenous/foreign); size; and sectors? In addressing these issues, we examine the growth impact at the level of the firm in terms of a number of indicators: e.g., employment, competitiveness, GDP, productivity and innovation, disaggregated by firm ownership. In particular, we explore the issue of whether economies less reliant on MNE activity and/or with a more thriving indigenous base are less vulnerable to the intensity of external shocks.
Section 1 introduces key conceptual issues and theoretical underpinnings of this paper by defining the term 'sustainable economic growth' in terms of industrial economic activity and policy. Section 2 depicts the impact of the shock on Ireland and Sweden in terms of growth rates, exports and employment. Section 3 outlines the development of Irish industrial activity and associated policies so as to shed light on the engine of structural change. For comparative purposes, Section 3 provides some brief insights into the industrial development trajectory in Sweden. Section 4 analyses the nationality of firms as an explanatory factor in the different impacts of the shock within the two economies. The analysis is somewhat hampered by the lack of data disaggregated by firm ownership (particularly in the case of Sweden), but key insights still emerge. Section 5 concludes the analysis and suggests some recommendations for policy.
Section 1: Sustainable Economic Growth

Definitional issues
Between the mid-1980s and mid-2008, the concept of 'sustainable economic growth' was overshadowed by that of short-term economic growth (by sustainable economic growth we mean positive and relatively high growth rates in the short-term that do not undermine long-term growth). A number of external shocks characterised this period of time (the collapse of the Berlin wall, the Asian economic crisis and the dot.com crash), but western economies rebounded relatively quickly. A major shock, such as the current banking crisis which has progressively been eroding the global real economy, brings to the fore the idea of 'economic vulnerability' (Andreosso-O'Callaghan, 2007 and Andreosso-O'Callaghan and Bassino, 2008) . The same external shock can have a different impact on two economies, depending on their relative level of 'vulnerability'. Economic vulnerability to external shocks can be minimised with increased independence or sovereignty. Economic dependence, as defined by Tiano (1982) , means that a country lacks the essentials in terms of economic policy making, technology and finance; financial dependence arises when a country has a demand for financial capital which exceeds its domestic supply of financial assets leading to growing national debt. In turn, dependence implies diminishing (economic) sovereignty,
Implications for this research
With regard to industrial development, we define economic sovereignty on the basis of the relative importance of indigenous firms in the manufacturing sector (and in particular those manufacturing firms engaged in higher value-added activities), since economic independence is an inverse relationship of inward foreign capital. Post WWII globalisation has involved nearly every nation of the world and has encroached on most aspects of economic activity, bringing with it the risk of decreased economic sovereignty. However, globalisation and diminished economic sovereignty should not be seen as synonymous; this implies that there is an optimal level of diminishing sovereignty (globalisation) (Bagwell and Staiger, 2001 ). Looking at the case of specific EU countries, can one ask whether economies closest to maintaining an optimal level of diminished sovereignty through appropriate industrial policies are less affected by the current economic crisis? And relatedly, are they more likely to benefit from sustainable economic growth?
Section 2: An analysis of the impact of the shock Consequently and by contrast, the severe collapse in property related taxes in Ireland has led to an increasing budget deficit; as a result, a restrictive budgetary policy has been implemented so as to lessen the impact on the government debt, which is forecast to reach nearly 100 per cent of GDP in 2011. Sweden's general government debt was 43.4 per cent in 2010, half that of Ireland's. Through these figures, the success of Sweden compared to Ireland in relation to policy response, can easily be seen (Table 1) .
Impact analysis (i) Macroeconomic indicators
(ii) Exports
By virtue of their size, both economies are highly dependent on exports. Swedish exports represent some 50 per cent of the country's GDP, making Sweden dependent on the buoyancy of the world market in general and of the EU market in particular, since the latter absorbs almost two-thirds of its exports. According to recent figures, Between 2006 and 2009, the unemployment rate increased by a third in Sweden (from 7 to 9%) and thereafter has fallen back to 7.1 per cent, whereas in Ireland the rate more than trebled (from 4.4 to 13.4%). Judging by this indicator alone, and in spite of a relatively favourable trade performance, the crisis seems to be an asymmetric shock, since it hit Ireland much harder.
Secondly, the drop in employment in Sweden took place primarily within the manufacturing industry whereas in Ireland, the construction sector was hardest hit. 1991, 1993 and 1996) . It peaked in 1999 and has been on a steady decline thereafter.
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The Period 1950-1970
Beginning with the Economic Development Plan (1958), Irish policymakers focussed on attracting FDI. In the 1960s, Ireland's economic policy changed from inwardlooking protectionism to external openness. Its industrial strategy became one of 'industrialisation by invitation'. As outlined by Begley et al. (2005) , in the 1960s a wave of predominately US-owned companies set up operations in Ireland. A key incentive during this period was Ireland's zero per cent tax on profits generated through exports (when Ireland entered the Common Market in 1973, a 10% corporate tax rate was imposed on export-oriented firms). Most companies that came to Ireland were well-established, mature industries who simply transferred manufacturing and assembly line operations to Ireland in areas such as textile, electrical goods, and electrical and mechanical components. There were very few supply chain linkages between these companies and local indigenous companies (Begley et al, 2005) .
The Period 1970-1980
From 1973 The 'crisis' in the 1980s was partly due to the fact that the Irish government had embarked on deficit financed expenditure programmes following oil price rises in the early 1970s and early 1980s. MNEs responded to the crisis by reducing investment and repatriating profits (the same pattern as today), contributing to a deficit in the balance of payments amounting to approximately 10% of GNP. Industrial development policy was criticised for its failure to support indigenous industry (e.g.
Telesis Report, 1982).
The 1990s onwards
As outlined previously, the food, beverage, and electrical/optical equipment industries enterprise stabilisation fund and a back to work allowance scheme). In our view, in this crisis it is not a shortage of ideas from policymakers and commentators (including academics) that is the problem but a lack of funding to deliver on such ideas. Given the strict austerity measures that the Irish Government has put in place (as part of an overall response to EU demands along with difficulties for Ireland in the banking sector and in sovereign debt markets in Europe) it is rather impossible to have any new enterprise policy interventions.
Currently, one of the problems in this enterprise sphere is the difficulty for SMEs in accessing finance. According to a report on Entrepreneurship from the Certified Public Accountants in Ireland (2010), the most pressing threat to entrepreneurship and start-up activity in Ireland is late debtor payments coupled with difficulties in accessing finance. The overriding conclusion here is that nothing of any major impact or significance with respect to new (and much needed) enterprise policy interventions will happen in Ireland until the banking sector is restructured. There is currently a conflict between industrial policy (real economy) and other policies (something which is not new as outlined by Välilä (2008)); the task of the Irish Government and of any Government should be to find an adequate balance between reordering the financial/banking sector and stimulating growth (industrial policy).
Industrial development activity and policy in Sweden
From the industrial take-off to the 1960s
In terms of industrial development, Sweden is considered a slow starter as well- abroad. Several elements explain the unfolding broad anatomy of Swedish production over these critical decades of industrial take-off and development: extraction and processing of raw materials allowed the country to specialise in mechanical engineering technologies; major innovations in machinery products were intimately connected with export activities (Edquist and Lundvall, 1993) . The ratio of engineering exports to total exports rose from 3 per cent in 1880 to 20 per cent in 1950, one of the highest ratios in the world after the USA (Edquist and Lundvall, 1993 
Period: 1970s and 1980s (the 'decades of uncertainty')
Like most European countries, Sweden was sharply affected by the oil shocks of the 1970s. The economic crisis opened the door to an 'offensive' industrial policy focusing on state ownership and public support to industries, including those in sunset areas such as textiles and shipbuilding (Benner, 1997) . In spite of its many limitations, this 'offensive' policy led to some important institutional developments: the creation of a Swedish Board for Technical Development (which was to become NUTEK), and initiation of a number of public-private projects geared to the development of new technologies in nuclear energy, telecommunications and military aircraft areas (Benner, 1997) . The 16 per cent devaluation of the Swedish krona in 1982 created a short term competitive advantage, by boosting manufacturing exports. These decades were nevertheless marked by uncertainty in terms of industrial direction. The country was becoming increasingly specialised in low growth industries, to the detriment of more knowledge-intensive (high-tech and R&D intensive) industries. As documented by Edquist and Texier (1996) , the proportion of production in R&D-intensive growth industries declined between 1975 and 1991.
The 1990s: EU membership and a new take-off
By putting an end to a few years of sharp banking and economic crisis, Sweden's accession to the EU in 1995 allowed the country to exploit the economies of scale offered by the large EU market. The latter part of this decade was marked by a number of post-financial crisis positive changes perceptible in the production fabric of the country. In particular, Sweden was able to reverse previous trends of non-optimal export specialisation by increasing its export share in high-technology and highdemand manufacturing products. In particular, Sweden's remarkable performance in telecommunication equipment and pharmaceutical products substantially improved the country's ranking as a high-technology world exporter (Braunerhjelm and Thulin, 2004 from mechanical engineering into electronics. The structure of production has been fairly stable, in that the engineering sector has been an important actor of industrial growth since WWII; structural change can nevertheless be seen in the case of chemicals and pharmaceuticals, a growing industry over time.
The contemporary period: the dawn of the new millennium and onwards
With the advent of the new millennium, Swedish industrial policy saw a number of changes; for example, NUTEK was split, becoming NUTEK and The Swedish
Agency for Innovation Systems (VINNOVA). Such changes transformed Swedish policy into an innovation as opposed to merely an industrial policy (Bitard et al., 2008) . Also, in the 1980s venture capital initiatives were consolidated by numerous government schemes aimed at providing seed and early-stage financing for innovating firms. Consolidation and expansion took place in the area of the dissemination and commercialization of university-based research. This emphasis on domestically commercialised research addresses the 'Swedish Innovation Paradox', according to which high R&D intensity in Sweden is not matched by a high share of high-tech (R&D intensive) products in manufacturing (Edquist and McKelvey, 1998; Bitard et al., 2008) .
As can be seen from this brief summary, the success of Swedish manufacturing firms, in particular Swedish MNEs abroad, is largely attributable to the country's long tradition of high and appropriate governmental involvement at all levels of industrial affairs. Although state aids in the 1970s 12 resulted in a sub-optimal allocation of resources, the industrial policy of the 1980s was redeployed towards forward-looking measures. Large efforts were made in favour of innovation, the introduction of new technologies across industries, fostering SMEs, and stimulating exports as well as a regional balance.
Swedish government policy has encouraged innovation-driven export manufacturing activities and SME development, particularly in latter years. The industrial policy response to the current crisis is again enshrined in a past, relatively successful, industrial trajectory. More specifically, additional funding of billion 8 Swedish krona has recently been allocated to University and public institutions R&D (OECD, 2009).
12 Sweden postponed the downturn caused by the oil shock through an expansionary fiscal policy; as a result, employment rates were maintained, but wage inflation led to dwindling export shares, particularly in the years 1974-76.
A number of indicators, such as a rapid upturn in exports followed by strong investment and higher consumption have made possible a strong rebound in both economic growth and employment (Statistics Sweden, 2010) . It is as if a solid manufacturing base, nurtured by appropriate industrial policies, had been somewhat resilient to the current shocks thereby allowing output, export, and employment growth to continue. In contrast to the Irish case, the MNE/indigenous dichotomy in Sweden does not coincide with a divide between large (efficient) and small (less efficient) firms. In Sweden, foreign firms are evenly distributed across manufacturing and services; indigenous firms control the highly export-oriented and technologybased engineering sector. Is this expected possible rebound due to the ownership structure (indigenous versus foreign firms)?
Section 4: The indigenous/foreign issue: does it matter?
Next we explore whether firm ownership/nationality helps explain current trends within the manufacturing sector in Ireland and Sweden.
The case of Ireland
As evidenced from 2010 CSO data (Census of Industrial Production), employment in Irish firms is dominated by more traditional sectors such as food products and beverages; textiles and clothing; wood; paper products, publishing and printing. The 'complex' economy sectors are dominated by foreign-owned firms. For example, foreign firms account for 80 per cent of those employed in the chemicals and chemical product sector. This is also the case for the electrical/optical equipment sector and the transport equipment sector. A more even distribution of ownership occurs in the machinery and equipment sector. In contrast, Irish firms dominate employment across all industries in the services sector.
Also, turnover is marginally dominated by Irish firms in the more traditional manufacturing sectors of food products and beverages, textiles and clothing, and wood (except furniture). Interestingly the opposite is the case for pulp, paper, paper products, publishing and printing. As expected, turnover in chemicals and chemical products is dominated by foreign-owned firms, but so is equally turnover in electrical/optical equipment, other transport equipment, and leather and petroleum products. Labour costs in Irish-owned firms are higher and have increased over time in the more traditional sectors of food products, beverages and textiles; labour costs in foreign firms tend to be higher in chemicals and chemical products, electrical/optical equipment, and transport equipment.
Labour productivity in foreign firms is higher than in Irish firms across all sectors, even those where Irish firms dominate. For example, labour productivity in the traditional sector of food products, beverages, textiles and clothing is almost 8 times higher in foreign-owned firms than in Irish-owned firms. In 1998 foreign firms in the chemicals sector were 8 times more productive than their Irish-owned counterparts; this increases to almost 10 times in 2006. The largest differential in the chemical sector occurred in 2002 when labour productivity in foreign owned firms was almost 16 times higher than that which prevailed in the case of Irish firms.
In all sectors over all years foreign-owned enterprises exported more than their indigenous counterparts (except in the case of non-metallic mineral products).
The indigenous/foreign issue in Swedish industry
As The growth in Ireland's unemployment rate has been unprecedented, with (so far) most of the job losses affecting the construction sector. Growth emanating from asset price inflation, spurred on by a combination of low interest rates, reckless lending and speculation, has proven to be a poor foundation for sustainable growth in Ireland. The challenge for Ireland at this juncture is to offset the contraction of the cyclically-based construction sector with job increases in both manufacturing and services. Based on a comparative examination of Ireland's industrial structure and strategy over a long period, the critical analysis of this paper assesses the chances that this adjustment can occur, which depends on the 'quality' of Ireland's productive structure, on its sustainability.
Although we agree that (price) competitiveness matters to some extent, the current paper highlights that a high cost economy such as Sweden can still have a more 'sustainable' growth rate than that of Ireland. This, we suggest, is due to the benefits of adopting a balanced approach in terms of firm ownership, and an industrial policy which makes innovative indigenous firms a cornerstone of its industrial strategy.
Swedish industrial strategy led to the establishment of large Swedish firms in the growing engineering sector, to the assistance of industries in decline through redeployment of workers displaced from traditional lower value-added activities towards more complex industries in higher value-added activities, and to a relatively strong focus on SMEs and stimulating exports. December; Budgetary and Economic Statistics 2010, Department of Finance, (2010) September; (10), (11) 
